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Ballot initiative #3 
Verifiable nuclear arms freeze 
Dr. Mark Edehnan, 
public policy economist, SDSU 
The third ballot initiative to 
be decided by Sou th Dakota 
voters in the November election 
is a resolution to determine 
support or opposition for a 
verifiable nuclear arms freeze 
between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. 
A ''yes'' vote on this ballot 
initiative registers support from 
South Dakota for a verifiable 
nuclear arms freeze between 
the United States and the Soviet 
Union. A "no" vote signifies 
opposition to registering support 
from Sou th Dakota for a 
l verifiable nuclear arms freeze. 
Specific provisions 
of the initiative 
The verifiable nuclear freeze 
resolution contains a preamble 
and three sections: 
AN ACT to require the Governor 
to notify the federal 
government that the people of 
South Dakota mandate a 
verifiable nuclear arms 
freeze. 
BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF 
THE ST ATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA: 
That prior to January 15, 
1985, the Governor of South 
Dakota shall inform the 
President of the United States 
and the members of the South 
Dakota Congressional Delegation 
that the people of South Dakota 
mandate the following: 
A. that the United States 
enter into an agreement with 
the Soviet Union that neither 
country will build, test, or put in 
place any more nuclear 
warheads; missiles, planes, 
submarines, or any other 
launchers designed to fire 
nuclear warheads; 
B. that the United States 
faithfully observe this 
agreement after it is signed, and 
that the United States closely 
monitor the Soviet Union to 
insure that it, too, is faithfully 
observing this agreement; 
C. and that the United States 
and the Soviet Union should 
then begin to reduce the number 
of their nuclear weapons in an 
orderly and balanced way, and 
to involve other nuclear nations 
in such reductions. 
What does this 
initiative do? 
The initiative says "the people 
of Sou th Dakota mandate a 
verifiable nuclear arms freeze.'' 
The term ''mandate'' often 
means to command or to order 
that something be done. 
However, in this case 
''mandate'' means to report 
voter preferences only. 
The United States Constitution 
states that it is the power and 
responsibility of the Congress 
and the President to provide for 
the common defense of the 
people. As a result, governments 
and voters from individual 
states have no authority or legal 
power to resolve the nuclear 
arms dilemma. The only power 
available to voters is the ability 
to publicly register sentiment 
and/or elect political leaders 
who may be able to solve the 
dilemma. 
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If passed, this proposal would 
require the Governor to inform 
the President and our South 
Dakota Congressional Delegation 
of the vote and the provisions of 
the initiative before January 15, 
1985. If defeated, no action 
would be required. 
However, in either case, the 
results will be reported by the 
media. The Congressional 
delegation and the White House 
will likely be aware of the 
initiative results as soon as they 
are tallied and reported. 
While passage of the 
amendment will not legally tie 
the hands of Congress or the 
President, if a number of states 
overwhelmingly pass or defeat 
similar resolutions, defense and 
budgetary votes in Congress 
may be affected and/or the 
President may be persuaded to 
adjust or reaffirm the nuclear 
arms negotiation strategy of our 
nation. 
Are other states voting 
on nuclear arms freeze? 
Presently, South Dakota is the 
only state that will vote on a 
nuclear freeze resolution this 
coming November 6th. 
In November 198 2, there were 
9 states, the District of 
Columbia, and 29 cities and 
counties with nuclear freeze 
resolutions on their ballots. The 
proposals passed in 8 states, 
Washington D.C., and in 27 
cities and counties. The 
approving states included North 
Dakota, Montana, California, 
Oregon, New Jersey, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
and Michigan. The measures 
were defeated in Arizona and 
two counties. An additional 
state, Wisconsin, approved the 
referendum prior to the general 
election. 
What is verification? 
There is disagreement among 
the analysts on what 
"adequate" verification means. 
Some suggest that the size of 
modern nuclear missiles is such 
that they may be easily 
disguised and hidden from 
satellites. If so, perhaps on-site 
inspection and selected off-site 
inspection by a neutral party is 
required. 
Others suggest that a 
combination of satellite 
inspection and intelligence 
sources is adequate for 
verification. 
Verification procedures are 
not defined in the ballot 
measure. Voting yes or no in 
November may depend on 
individual beliefs about what 
'' a de qua te'' verification is and 
whether it will exist. 
Is nuclear parity 
a valid issue? 
The U.S. can negotiate from 
(1) a position of nuclear 
superiority, (2) nuclear parity, 
or (3) nuclear inferiority. Voting 
yes or no on this initiative may 
depend upon individual beliefs 
about where the U.S. is now and 
where we ought to be when we 
enter a nuclear freeze. 
In addition, there are those 
who believe that nuclear parity 
is irrelevant. They argue that 
the consequences of the East 
and West being able to 
annihilate the world 10 times 
over is the same as 40 times 
over and that more weapons 
only increase the chances that 
they will be used. 
Voter access to strategical 
information is limited 
While South Dakota voters 
may be able to study our 
defense system and assess the 
strategy of our leaders, we have 
only limited access to 
intelligence data on defense 
capabilities and the strategy of 
the Soviet Union. As a result, 
some have debated whether or 
not the voters in general have 
"adequate" information to 
appraise the nuclear freeze 
issue. 
In the final analysis, some 
people believe that a nuclear 
arms freeze agreement can be 
successful and that an attempt 
to negotiate should be made. In 
contrast, others believe that an 
agreement can not be 
successfully implemented or that 
negotiations should not be made 
at the present time. There are 
risks associated with both 
options. 
Whether Ballot Initiative 3 
contributes to or hinders the 
nuclear arms negotiation 
process is a value judgment that 
South Dakota voters will make 
on November 6th. 
Additional defense 
and military facts 
A basic understanding of our 
defense resources and military 
facts is helpful in making 
informed conclusions and voter 
decisions on the nuclear freeze 
issue. 
Why do we have a military? 
Four fundamental reasons for 
a military include preservation 
of U.S. sovereignty, protection of 
the life and liberty of U.S. 
citizens, protection of the 
'!general welfare" of U.S. 
citizens, and enhancement of 
global security and stability. 
What are the priority missions? 
The priorities of our military 
are enumerated in various 
government documents. These 
include defense of the homeland, 
defense of our allies (NATO, 
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, 
South Korea, and other selected 
Pacific and Asian neighbors), 
defense of our access to 
resources (Mideast and Africa), 
and extension of deterrence 
against communism (Central and 
South America). 
With present concerns over 
the size of federal budget 
deficits, both major political 
parties have been looking for 
ways to reduce defense 
expenditures. The President's 
Grace Commission recently 
recommended defense 
management moves that would 
save nearly $100 billion over 3 
years. These recommendations 
included standardizing 
replacement parts, streamlining 
procurement processes, shifting 
to multi-year contracts, having 
private opera tors operate 
commissaries, and closing some 
military bases. 
In addition, the development 
of any new weapons system 
commits the government to long-
term expenditures. The 
development of B-1 bombers, 
land-based missile systems, and 
space defense can require 10 to 
20 years. Some technologies may 
·become obsolete or not practical 
in combat trials even before 
they can be widely adopted. 
The budget questions center 
around the following: How much 
nuclear defense spending 
provides for "adequate 
defense"? Are our allies paying 
their fair share? Should current 
taxpayers pay for current 
defense expenditures or should 
How much do we spend on 
defense? 
1945 
Actual dollars (bil.) 82 
Percent of the 
federal budget (% ) 86 
Percent of Gross 
National Product( % ) 39 
e = prelimina ry estimate 
Source: Vari ous U.S. budgets and histo rical statisti cs 
future taxpayers pay for 
current defense expenditures 
through deficit spending? The 
answers involve value judgments 
made by Congress and the 
President. 
How is the defense 
budget allocated? 
The Conventional Forces are 
designed to deter, defend, and 
retaliate against attacks by 
)utilizing mostly manpower and 
conventional weapons. The 
conventional forces include 
ground, air, naval, rapid 
deployment, and reserve forces. 
How do we compare 
with the USSR? 
Estimated 
1982 status 
Popula tion (mil) 
Military spending (bil) 
% of GNP (% ) 
Strategical nuclear 
warheads 
All nuclear warheads 
Military 
manpower (mil) 
Attack submarines 
Major warships 
Camba t aircraft 
Tanks and 
heavy artillery 
NATO 
626 
287 
4.8 
5.8 
232 
428 
12,000 
46,000 
1955 1965 1975 1984 
40 50 86 237e 
59 42 26 28e 
10 7.2 5.5 6.7e 
Some tactical intermediate-
range nuclear weapons are also 
included in this function. The 
conventional forces account for 
46% of the defense budget. 
Strategic Forces are designed 
to deter, def end, and retaliate 
against a nuc~ear attack. 
Included are offensive weapons 
in the "nuclear triad," nuclear 
defense weapons systems, and 
the command control. The triad 
includes (1) land-based Inter-
Continental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBMs), (2) ocean-based 
Submarine Launched Ballistic 
Missiles (SLBMs ), and (3) air-
based bombers with nuclear 
U.S. 
232 
176 
5.9 
9,975 
30,000 
2.1 
95 
206 
7,200 
18,500 
Warsaw 
Pact 
380 
211 
10.6 
4.8 
298 
296 
12 ,000 
87,000 
USSR 
272 
191 
11.9 
7,226 
20,000 
4 .3 
273 
290 
6,300 
70,000 
Note that numbers do no t por tray technical obsolescence or differences in cha racteri s ti cs of the 
various nuclea r wa rheads. From va rious defense sources as compiled and published by the League of 
Women Voters in " Dolla rs fo r defense." 1983. Corr abora ted by addi tional media sources. 
The degree of confidence in the Soviet block estima tes is understandably less than for NATO and 
the U.S. , however, the estimates a re based on the bes t ava ila ble informa tion. 
weapons (B-52s and B-ls). 
Strategic forces account for 
10 % of the defense budget. 
Support Services include 
intelligence and communication, 
research and development, 
general supply and procurement 
activities, training and medical 
services, and management of 
resources not allocated to the 
conventional or strategic forces. 
Support services account for 
44 % of the defense budget. 
Are there vulnerabilities in 
our strategic defense? 
Presently, 50% of our nuclear 
warheads are based on 
submarines, 28 % are on 
bombers , and 22 % are land-
based missiles. 
Defense analysts suggest that 
the submarines are the most 
survivable and least vulnerable 
to Soviet attack. However, there 
are more command 
communication control problems 
with coordination of submarine 
attacks. 
Improved USSR defense has 
increased the risk that bombers 
would be destroyed before they 
reach their targets. So, air-
based technology development 
has concentrated on attaching 
cruise missiles to bombers and 
on stealth bombers that can 
"hide" from radar. 
The League of Women Voters 
and other media sources 
indicate that most analysts 
believe that USSR multiple-
war head technology makes the 
U.S. land-based ICBMs 
vulnerable. Recently, some 
analysts have suggested that 
90% of our land-based ICBMs 
would likely be wiped out before 
we could retaliate to a first 
strike by the USSR. 
The administration has 
contended that the land-based 
ICBMs are necessary to keep 
the USSR from focusing on the 
other two legs of our nuclear 
triad-air and sea based 
missiles. Therefore, 
improvement is needed to 
reduce the vulnerability of the 
land-based ICBMs to a first 
strike. 
Several proposals have 
included hardening the present 
missile silos, moving the missiles 
among various sites, building 
missile silos in a dense pack, 
and a space defense system. 
Critics claim that the 
remaining 80 % of our missiles 
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in the triad are a sufficient 
deterrent. They claim that the 
land-based missile system 
improvement proposals are too 
costly and that the system would 
still be vulnerable after 
improvement. 
In the final analysis, the 
decisions by Sou th Dakota 
voters on whether the timing is 
right for a nuclear freeze may 
be influenced by our 
understanding of (1) the costs 
and vulnerabilities of our 
present nuclear defense system, 
(2) the present proposals on 
"improving" our nuclear 
defense, and (3) the beliefs 
about how we compare to the 
Soviet military. 
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